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to believe that... an accused... has been prejudiced by receipt of the
information.' 37 Harris can be construed as holding that even matters
traditionally considered to be internal may be examined by the court in
cases where prejudice to the defendant can be shown. In fact, Harris
holds that courts have an "affirmative duty 'to investigate the charges and
to ascertain whether... as a matter of fact, the jury was guilty of such
misconduct.'
38
Even after Jenkins, the Harris holding may allow inquiry into jury
discussion of parole in certain cases. The court in Harris noted that that
case involved a specific factual assertion by a juror based on particular
personal knowledge, and that it was not a mere assertion of opinion.
Therefore thejury foreman's statement in Jenkins, "Okay in ten years, do
you want your child to run into [the defendant] on the street?" may not
qualify as more than a mere assertion of opinion under Harris.
In light ofHarris, defense counsel should continue to assail Virginia's
prohibition on evidence of parole eligibility at the sentencing phase.
Jenkins offers an opportunity for defense counsel to point out the
hypocrisy of the rule: although juries are told that they may not take
parole eligibility into consideration, case after case, like Jenkins, demon-
strates that there is clear evidence that juries do exactly that.39 Further-
more, defense counsel should take advantage of Harris and consider
having jurors questioned during voir dire about their knowledge of the
parole system, and post-trial to determine whether parole eligibility
37 Id. at 51, 408 S.E.2d at 601 (quoting Commercial Union
hIsurance Co. v. Moorefield, 231 Va. 260, 265, 343 S.E.2d 329, 333
(1986)).
38 Harris, 13 Va. App. at 52, 408 S.E.2d at 601 (quoting Evans-
Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 209, 361 S.E.2d 436, 448
(1987)).
39 See Hood, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its
Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1624
(1989) (citing National Legal Research Group, Inc., Jury Research and
entered into their deliberations. It seems unlikely that the Virginia courts
will be able to maintain their bar on parole eligibility evidence if the
defense bar is diligent in pointing out the disparities between the
theoretical foundations upon which the courts depend and the realities of
juror deliberations.
40
IV. Page Limits on Briefs Submitted to Virginia Supreme Court
In his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Jenkins' counsel, in
order to stay within the fifty page limit for briefs submitted to that court,
merely referred to the trial transcript, rather than incorporating that
material verbatim into his brief. The court admonished counsel remind-
ing him that "[a] cross-reference to argument made at trial is insuffi-
cient."'4 1 While page limits on appellate briefs clearly serve a useful
purpose, the effectiveness of a defendant's appeal, especially in a capital
trial, should not rest on his counsel's ability to include all arguments
within fifty pages. If defense counsel harbor any doubts about their
ability to stay within the fifty page limit and still effectively make all
arguments, counsel should apply to the court for permission to submit a
lengthier brief. Should the court deny the request, counsel should object
on the constitutional grounds of denial of due process, thereby preserving
a viable federal claim for further appeal.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
Trial Simulation Services, Report on Jurors' Attitudes Concerning the
Death Penalty (Dec. 6, 1988)). See also Paduano and Stafford Smith,
Deathly Errors: Juror Misconceptions Concerning Parole in the Impo-
sition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211, 221-22 &
nn. 30-34 (1987).
40 For a more extensive discussion of parole eligibility evidence,
see Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol.5, No. 1, p.4 5 (1992).
41 Jenkins, 244 Va. at 461,423 S.E.2d at 370.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, an African-American man named Warren McCleskey was
convicted of armed robbery and murder for killing a white police officer
during the robbery of a furniture store.1 McCleskey received a life
sentence for the armed robbery and a death sentence for the murder.
In appealing his convictions and death sentence, McCleskey raised
a fundamental challenge to the Georgia capital sentencing scheme.
McCleskey claimed that the Georgia death penalty was applied in a
racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments. McCleskey relied upon an elaborate statistical study by
Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth
(the "Baldus study") which demonstrated a disparity in the application of
the death penalty based upon the race of the victim. The Baldus study
I McCleskey admitted his role in the robbery, but denied that he was
the one who killed the victim. McCleskey was one of four people who
took part in the robbery.
3 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
3 Indeed, the Court assumed the validity of the Baldus study and
stated that it "demonstrate[d] a risk that the factor of race entered into
isolated and then accounted for thirty-nine variables which could have
explained the disparities on non-race grounds. The study concluded that
defendants charged with killing a white victim are 4.3 times more likely
to be sentenced to death than those charged with killing a black victim.
McCleskey's challenge ultimately was unsuccessful. In a five to
four decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the study
proffered by McCleskey was insufficient to show either a Fourteenth
Amendment or an Eighth Amendment violation.
2
Despite the Court's ruling, the unfortunate phenomenon of race
discrimination continues to exist in capital sentencing. 3 This article
will provide an analysis of the McCleskey decision under both the
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments and then suggest ways that the
capital defense attorney can argue race discrimination in a "post-
McCleskey world."
some capital sentencing decisions" 481 U.S. at 291, n. 7 (emphasis in
original). Further statistical studies have reached the same conclusion as
the Baldus study. See Gen. Gov't Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office
Rep. GGD-9, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates a Pattern
ofRacialDisparities (Feb. 26, 1990) (describing the results of twenty-
eight empirical studies).
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II. McCLESKEY v. KEMP
A. The Equal Protection Claim
McCleskey's first argument was that the Georgia capital punish-
ment statute violated his right to "the Equal Protection of the laws" under
the Fourteenth Amendment. He claimed that racial considerations
played a part in the Georgia capital penalty system in two ways: (1) those
who murder white victims are more likely to receive the death penalty
than those who murder blacks, and (2) black defendants are more likely
to receive the death penalty than white defendants.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, began by stating
the requirements for a claim under the Equal Protection Clause:
[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has
the burden of proving "the existence of purposeful discrimi-
nation." A corollary to this principle is that a criminal
defendant must prove that the purposeful discrimination "had
a discriminatory effect" on him. Thus, to prevail under the
Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory pur-
pose.
4
Noting that McCleskey's only proof in support of his equal protec-
tion claim was the Baldus study, the majority then discussed and
distinguished the "limited contexts" of jury selection 5 and Title VII
cases 6 in which statistics have been accepted as proof of intent to
discriminate.7 First, the decision to impose the death penalty is made by
a jury which meets only for the occasion of making that one decision. In
4 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
5 Id. at 293-94. The Court noted that the statistical proof necessary
to prove an equal protection violation in the jury selection process is less
than the "'stark' pattern" necessary in other contexts. Id. (citing Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977 . Id. at 294 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-401
(1986) (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in part)).
7 Id. at 293.
8 Id. at 295, n. 15.
9 Id. at 295, n. 14 (relying on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
112 (1982)). The Court's argument rested on the rule requiring that the
sentencer in a capital case cannot be "precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of [the] defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death."Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (emphasis in original). However, this rule is not applied as
broadly as the McCleskey Court indicated. As Justice Powell's opinion
itself acknowledged, theLockettlEddings rule requires that the proffered
mitigating evidence be "relevant to the defendant's background, char-
acter [or] the offense." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295, n. 14 (emphasis
added). As a result, capital defendants have notbeen entitled to introduce
literally "any" evidence in mitigation without limits. See, e.g., Straube,
The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 4 5 (1992) (noting that Virginia courts, with the approval
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have refused to permit capital
defendants to inform juries of the true meaning of a life sentence as a
reason to impose a sentence less than death).
The McCleskey Court also overstated the "limits" on what may be
considered in venire-selection and Title VII cases. Justice Powell quoted
two statutes which supposedly "limit" such considerations in the venire-
selection context more than the "relevancy" limitation in the capital
penalty context. The first statute stated that "[a] grand juror must be a
contrast, the Court noted that "[tihe decisions of ajury commission or of
an employer over time are fairly attributable to the commission or the
employer. Therefore, an unexplained statistical discrepancy can be said
to indicate a consistent policy of the decisionmaker."8 Second, theCourt
noted that the factors which may be considered in venire-selection and
Title VII cases are "limited," while the factors which a capital jury may
consider are more all-encompassing. 9 Finally, the Court pointed out that
in venire-selection and Title VII cases, "the decisionmaker has an
opportunity to explain the statistical disparity." 10 In capital cases, on
the other hand, policy considerations require that "'jurors cannot be
called to testify to the motives and influences that led to their ver-
dict,"' 11 and prosecutors have "wide discretion" and should not be
forced to defend their decisions to seek death penalties.
12
The Court considered all of these factors against the backdrop of
its express concern that McCleskey's challenge was directed at "deci-
sions at the heart of the State's criminal justice system."' 13 Conse-
quently, the majority held that "[b]ecause discretion is essential to the
criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof
before we would infer that the discretion has been abused." 14 Accord-
ing to five justices of the United States Supreme Court, the Baldus
study was "clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the
decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory pur-
pose."15
The Court addressed one final argument under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. McCleskey argued that the State as a whole, presumably
through its legislature, acted with discriminatory purpose by allowing
the death penalty to be administered in a discriminatory fashion.
However, the Court found no evidence that Georgia's legislature had
maintained its death penalty "'because of' . . . its adverse effects upon
citizen of Texas and of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be
'of sound mind and good moral character,' be literate, have no prior
felony conviction, and be under no pending indictment 'or other legal
accusation for theft or of any felony."' See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295,
n. 14 (quoting Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,485 (1977)) (empha-
sis added). The second statute provided that "jury commissioners may
exclude any [juror who is] not 'upright' and 'intelligent' from grand
jury service." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295, n. 14 (quoting Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 354 (1970)) (emphasis added). Both of these
statutes can reasonably be read at least as broadly as the Court's Lockett/
Eddings rule for capital defendants. As long as a factor is "relevant" to
soundness of mind, character, uprightness, or intelligence, it can be
considered in venire-selection cases. This mirrors the Court's capital
case standard that mitigating evidence must be "relevant" to the offense
or the defendant's background or character in order for the Eighth
Amendment to require its admission into evidence.
Similarly, the Court noted that employment decisions under Title
VII "may involve a number of relevant variables" which must all have a
"reasonable relationship to the employee's qualifications to perform
the particular job at issue." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295, n. 14 (emphasis
added). This "reasonable relationship" limitation bears no apparent
difference to the "relevance" requirement in the capital penalty context.
10 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296.
11 Id. (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585,
593 (1907)). But see Fed R. Evid. 606(b): "[A] juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror." For an analysis of the issues
pertaining to the admissibility ofjuror testimony, see infra notes 84-108
and accompanying text.
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an identifiable group." 16 As a result, the Court rejected McCleskey's
equal protection claims. 17
B. The Eighth Amendment Claim
McCleskey also argued that the Baldus study showed that Georgia's
capital sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment's proscrip-
tion of "cruel and unusual punishments."' 18 The McCleskey majority
turned its attention to the Baldus study itself. The Court began by noting
that statistics "at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor
entered into some decisions" and said "[t]he question 'is at what point
that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable.' 19 The Court ruled
that the Baldus study did not demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of racial
bias to render his death sentence constitutionally unsound.
20
Justice Powell characterized the Baldus study as indicating "a
discrepancy that appears to correlate with race"2 1 but concluded that the
discrepancy alone was insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the
Eighth Amendment:
Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unex-
plained is invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to
minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of
jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that
discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the
Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally signifi-
cant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process. 22
Thus, while reiterating its "'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial
prejudice from our criminal justice system,"'23 the Court also cautioned
that these efforts were "guided" by the privilege of trial by jury,
necessitating the hands-off approach which courts have taken with
respect to jury decisions. The Court firmly rooted its Eighth Amendment
ruling in the discretion which a jury necessarily must have.24
The Court concluded its Eighth Amendment analysis by stating
two additional "concerns." First, the Court noted that a finding in
16 Id. at 298.
17 Id. at 299.
18 The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
19 Id. at 308-309 (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36, n. 6
(1983.- Id. at 309.
21 Id. at 312.
22 Id. at 313.
23 Id. at 309 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)).
24 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311-312. The Court noted that such
discretion necessarily empowers a jury to discriminate, but concluded
that depriving ajury of discretion would be "totally alien to ... notions
of criminal justice." Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
25 It is questionable whether this assertion is indeed true. While the
majority is correct in stating that "[t]he Eighth Amendment... applies
to all penalties," id. at 315, the heightened reliability requirement of the
Eighth Amendment has been fashioned in capital cases only. See, e.g.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
2 6McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 317-318. As Justice Brennan's dissent-
ing opinion observes, this seems to express "a fear of too much justice."
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 319.
28 See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punish-
favor of McCleskey would have opened the floodgates for claims of
racial bias in all areas of criminal law.25 Secondly, the Court feared that
statistical studies might also demonstrate disparities based on the race,
sex, facial characteristics or physical attractiveness of the defendant,
victim, judge or attorney. 26 The Court was unwilling to open those
floodgates and suggested that McCleskey's arguments could best be
addressed by legislatures.
2 7
III. ARGUING RACE DISCRIMINATION
AFTER McCLESKEY
Despite unusually loud criticism, 28 the Supreme Court is unlikely
to retreat from the principles enunciated in McCleskey. As disappointing
as the decision may be, however, McCleskey did not rule that the issue
of race discrimination was irrelevant in capital sentencing; rather, the
Court found that the petitioner failed to present a cognizable claim on the
facts he alleged. There are several avenues which McCleskey left open
for a challenge to a death sentence based on racial discrimination, under
both the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. The most important
strategy in arguing racial prejudice is to explain why a particular
defendant's argument differs from the situation addressed in McCleskey.
A. Stronger Statistics
In rejecting McCleskey's Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court
found the Baldus study to be "insufficient" 29 and implicitly acknowl-
edged that statistics can be used as circumstantial evidence of an intent
to discriminate.30 Similarly, in rejecting McCleskey's Eighth Amend-
ment claim, the Court stated that the Baldus study did not present a
"constitutionally significant risk of racial bias. ' 31 The Court thus left the
door open for a statistical challenge which demonstrated a greater
disparity than the Baldus study.32 Realistically, however, it is unlikely
that any empirical study could show a significantly greater disparity
along racial lines than the Baldus study. Thus, although the Court has not
necessarily set out to create an absolute barrier to claims based solely on
statistical evidence, the practical effect of McCleskey is, in all likelihood,
to do just that.
ment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1988);
Gronhovd, Note, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The
Debate Rksurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev.
688 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term- Leading Cases, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 119, 158 (1987); Bienen, Of Race, Crime and Punish-
ment, N.Y. Times, June21,1987, atA22; Tubak,NewD, msRatify
Unfair Death Penalty, Legal Times, May 4, 1987, at 18; Bedau,
Someday McCleskey Will be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. Times,
May 1, 1987, § 2, at 5.; Lewis, Bowing to Racism, N.Y. Times, Apr.
28, 1987, atA3 1; Discrimination in Death? Yes,5-4, N.Y. Times, Apr.
24, 1987, atA30; Killers of Whites, Killers ofBlacks, N.Y. Times, Oct.
16, 1986, at A38. But see Scheidegger, Capital Punishment in 1987:
The Puzzle Nears Completion, 15 W. State U. L. Rev. 95, 121-25
(1987).
29 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
30 Seeid.at291,n.7.
31 Id. at 313.
32 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 520 N.E.2d 348, 358-59 (Ill.)
(Simon, I., dissenting) (arguing that McCleskey "did not foreclose
entirely the possibility that equal protection violations could be proven
in an individual case through the use of statistical evidence"), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988). See also State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527,
538 (Mo.) (characterizing the McCleskey decision as "seldom" permit-
ting statistics alone to give rise to an equal protection claim), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 933 (1987).
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B. Statistics Pertaining to a More Narrow
Class of Decisionmakers
In arguing that McCleskey's statistics did not prove discrimination,
the Court relied in part on the large number of decisionmakers in the
administration of a state's death penalty. The Court also relied upon the
uniqueness of each jury, stating that no state-wide statistical disparity can
fairly be attributed to the unique jury which meets for one isolated
occasion in any particular trial. These comments seem to suggest a
preference by the Court for studies which are more focused on the
particular area where the sentencing decisions are being made. Even
more ideally, an empirical study might be directed at the charging
decisions of an individual prosecutor's office. The Court left this
possibility open, characterizing as "questionable" whether such a claim
could be maintained. 33 Such an allegation would make the claim of
racial bias much more analogous to "decisions of a jury commission or
of an employer" which are "fairly attributable" to the decisionmaker over
time.
34
Several courts have been presented with more localized claims of
racial bias than McCleskey presented in his case. Those claims have been
unsuccessful, but the arguments warrant discussion. In some cases, the
claims were flawed from the outset based on the way in which the issues
were framed.
An empirical study which differs from the Baldus study only in that
the size of the surveyed area is more focused is unlikely, standing alone,
to lead to success in court. Such a study still fails to account for the
uniqueness of each jury and the difficulty of attributing decisions over
time directly to anyone. 35 This is exactly how courts have responded to
statistical claims of racial bias in a particular county or city. For example,
in People v. Williams,36 the defendant challenged his sentence based on
a county-specific empirical study.37 The Court summarily dismissed the
claim, relying on McCleskey.38 Similarly, the defendant in State v.
Byrd39 attempted to show racial bias in Hamilton County, Ohio. The
Court denied relief because Byrd failed to demonstrate "evidence that
improper racial considerations prompted the jury's recommendation of
death in this case."40
33 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295, n. 15.
34 Id. See also Fullerv. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons andParoles,
851 F.2d 1307 (1 th Cir. 1988). In Fuller, a black inmate brought a civil
rights action against the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles,
alleging that parole decisions were made in a racially discriminatory
manner. Fuller presented empirical evidence which demonstrated that
white inmates had been paroled at a higher frequency than black inmates.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Fuller's claim, but acknowledged that his
challenge was "more specific than McCleskey's because it focuses on the
decisions of a single entity, the Georgia Parole Board, rather than the
decisions of many unique juries." Id. at 1310. The court also noted that
underMcCleskey, "an unexplained statistical showing of disparate racial
treatment by a single entity over a period of time could raise the inference
of an equal protection violation." Id.
35 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In addition, a local
study will ordinarily attempt to draw broad conclusions about race
discrimination in an area based on arelatively small sample of cases. The
McCleskey Court anticipated this problem. 481 U.S. at 296, n. 15.
36 588 N.E.2d 983, 1022 (1l. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 218
(1992).
37 See Murphy, Application of the Death Penalty in Cook County,
73 Ill. B. J. 90 (1984).
38 Williams, 588 N.E.2d at 1022.
39 512 N.E.2d 611,619 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1037
(1988).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Van Cleave v. State, 517 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 1987), cert.
A potentially more successful strategy is to focus on an individual
decisionmaker to whom decisions can fairly be attributed over time, such
as the prosecuting attorney's office.41 In pursuing this strategy, a county-
specific empirical study can be useful in convincing a court to allow
further inquiry into the local charging policies and practices of the
prosecutor's office.42
This is the approach which the defendant took in People v.
McPeters.43 McPeters relied on statistical disparities in the administra-
tion of the death penalty in Fresno County, California and sought
discovery relating to local charging practices. The California Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of the request, relying partly on McCleskey's
recognition of the necessity for prosecutorial discretion and partly on
flaws in the supporting statistical study itself.44 If an appropriate
foundation can be laid with an unflawed empirical study, however, it
seems that such a request should be granted. Indeed, the McCleskey
Court itself, while emphasizing the importance of prosecutorial discre-
tion, stated unequivocally that such discretion "cannot be exercised on
the basis of race."
45
If a prosecutor appears to have followed a pattern of pursuing the
death penalty in a way that correlates with race, defense attorneys should
first seek further information. If a non-racial reason for the pattern is not
apparent, then two claims are available under McCleskey. First, attor-
neys should claim that the unexplained pattern is sufficient by itself to
demonstrate a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim
would analogize the statistical disparity to venire-selection and Title VII
cases discussed by the McCleskey majority, where statistics can create
an inference of purposeful discrimination.46 When making this claim, it
should be noted that the McCleskey Court itself specifically left open the
possibility that statistics could be used to challenge a specific prosecutor's
charging policies.47 Secondly, defense attorneys may argue that the
unexplained pattern gives rise to a constitutionally significant risk of
racial bias in violation of the Eighth Amendment. It should be empha-
sized that the unexplained pattern of racial discrimination is attributable
to an on-going identifiable entity, the prosecutor's office, unlike the more
general pattern alleged by McCleskey.
denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1988). In Van Cleave, the defendant claimed that
the prosecutor in his county had engaged in a pattern of racial discrimi-
nation in pursuing the death penalty. Despite the fact that discovery had
provided Van Cleave with detailed information of all death penalty cases
filed by the prosecutor, Van Cleave failed to supplement his claim of race
discriminationwith any supportingevidence. By dismissing Van Cleave's
claim based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the court implicitly
acknowledged that a properly substantiated claim could give rise to a
cognizable constitutional challenge. Id. at 372.
42 A useful analogy can be drawn toBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986). Under Batson, if a prosecuting attorney uses peremptory
challenges in a way that demonstrates a pattern correlating with race, the
burden is on the attorney to explain those challenges. Similarly, if a
primafacie case of race discrimination can be shown in a local office's
charging policies, a court might be persuaded to permit broader discov-
ery pertaining to those policies.
43 832 P.2d 146 (Cal. 1992).
44 Id. at 155.
45 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309, n. 30 (citing Wayte v. UnitedStates,
470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114
(1979); and Oylerv. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962)). See also U.S. v.Bernal-
Rojas, 933 F.2d 97 (1stCir. 1991) ("Although prosecutorial discretion is
shielded from intense judicial review, it cannot be wielded in a manner
which discriminates against a constitutionally protected class.") (cita-
tions omitted).
46 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294-95; n. 14; n. 15.
47 Id. at 295, n. 15.
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It is extremely important that attorneys distinguish the claims
being made from those presented in McCleskey. If a court fails to see
the subtle differences between a pattern premised on a prosecutor's
charging practices and a pattern premised on results only, the claim
almost certainly will fail. A prime example is State v. Irick.4 8 In Irick,
the defendant attempted to call the Knox County District Attorney
General as a witness to demonstrate that he had never requested the
death penalty in a case where the victim was black. Irick's victim was
white, and he claimed that the Knox County District Attorney improp-
erly discriminated against him on that basis. In support of his request,
Irick presented statistical data on all reported homicide cases in Knox
County from 1978 to 1986, through the testimony of a state-paid
investigator, hick's request was denied, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed his subsequent death sentence.49 The court relied on
McCleskey and ruled that hick had "utterly failed" to prove that "the
decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."'50 The
court saw the statistics and quickly retreated to McCleskey. What the
court failed to see was that hick was making an allegation of discrimi-
nation in his case and sought discovery to support that claim. Attor-
neys making such a claim must be prepared to convince the court that
an easy retreat to McCleskey is not available where the proffered
statistical showing goes to a specific on-going actor like the prosecutor's
office.
C. Case-Specific Indicia of Racial Prejudice
The one avenue for challenge which McCleskey most clearly left
open is a case-specific claim of racial discrimination based upon facts
in the defendant's own case. Such a showing is difficult to make. 51
The problem is determining what facts would suffice to show purpose-
ful discrimination in an individual case.52 An even greater problem is
that such evidence rarely manifests itself in tangible forms. Few
modem juries, judges or prosecutors would admit to purposefully
treating defendants differently because of their race or the victim's
race. However, as it is said, "[d]enial ain't just a river in Egypt."
53
Defense attorneys bear the burden of digging deeper to discover if
racial prejudice has infected the decisionmaking process in an uncon-
stitutional manner.
A racial prejudice claim of this nature is necessarily fact-specific.
No boilerplate pre-trial motion or supporting memorandum can ad-
equately present and preserve this argument.54 The facts which might
demonstrate an intent to discriminate on the basis of race are as varied
as one's imagination. Attorneys must be attentive and creative in
supporting a claim of racial bias with specific facts. An analysis of the
cases where such claims have been made will provide insight into the
various contexts in which racial prejudice can rear its ugly head in the
capital sentencing process. And, although many of these claims
48 762 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072
(1989).
49 Id. at 135.
50 Id.
51 See generally Herbrand, Annotation, What Constitutes Such
Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement ofLaws as to Provide Valid
Defense in State Criminal Proceedings, 95 A.L.R.3d 280 (1979);
Herbrand, Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecu-
tion or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in Federal
Criminal Proceedings, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 732 (1979); 13 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 2d 609, Discriminatory Enforcement of Criminal Law (1977).
52 See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988), vacated,
491 U.S. 902 (1989). InDaniels, the defendantsought funds for an expert
to determine whether Indiana administered its death penalty in a dis-
criminatory fashion. The defendant acknowledged that this, standing
alone, would not demonstrate a constitutional violation. However,
ultimately failed, some have convinced a court, or at least one judge,
that the McCleskey threshold requirement was satisfied.
1. Robinson v. State
In Robinson v. State,55 the Florida Supreme Court found suffi-
cient indicia of racial prejudice to warrant reversal of the death
sentence.56 At trial, the prosecuting attorney conducted the following
cross-examination of a defense expert witness:
Mr. Alexander (prosecutor): Would you say, Doctor, that it's
a fair statement that the Defendant, Mr. Robinson, is preju-
diced toward white people, specifically, women?
Doctor Krop: I don't know if he's prejudiced against them
in the way we typically think of prejudice in terms of feeling
like whites are worse than blacks or blacks are worse than
whites. I think he has probably a lot of hostility built up. I
don't know enough about his history in terms of whether
there were racial prejudices which occurred substantially in
his own background which would back that up, but I think he
just has a lot of difficulty with women in general and I really
can't say whether it's necessarily a racial hostility.
Mr. Alexander: In regard to one of the answers you gave Mr.
Pearl, you noted the Defendant had told you about several
victims in the past in regard to sexual encounters. Are you
familiar with the gender and race of those particular
victims?
Doctor Krop: I believe that Mr. Pearl indicated that they
were white.
Mr. Alexander: Do you know if they were male or female?
DoctorKrop: I probably don't know for sure. Ipresumethey
were white females.
Mr. Alexander: And you know the victim in this case also
was a white female, do you not?
Doctor Krop: Yes, I do.57
At this point, defense counsel finally objected and moved for a
mistrial. Counsel argued that this examination was an attempt to make
an improper racial appeal. The defendant was black, the victim was
white, and the jury was all white. The trial court denied the request for
Daniels claimed that the expert would have testified to "other" evidence
in support of his claim. The court rejected Daniels' argument, holding
that he must assert what "other" evidence would be presented. Id. at 783.
53 See Senator Al Gore, Remarks at the University of Texas at
Austin (Aug. 27, 1992) (quoting from a song by Dire Straits). See also Al
Franken, I'm Good Enough, I'm Smart Enough, and Doggone it, People
Like Me-Daily Affirmations by Stuart Smalley at Dec. 1 (Dell Paper-
back 1992).
54 But see Comment Note, Annotation, Preconviction Procedure
forRaising Contention that Enforcement of Penal Statute is Unconstitu-
tionally Discriminatory, 4 A.L.R.3d 404 (1965).
5 520 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1988).
56 Although the court also found that the State impermissibly
argued a nonstatutory aggravating factor, the court found the claim of
racial prejudice to be "even more damaging." Id. at 6.
5 See id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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a mistrial and refused to give a cautionary instruction to the jury.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that"the prosecutor's
examination of this witness was a deliberate attempt to insinuate that
appellant had a habit of preying on white women and thus constituted
an impermissible appeal to bias and prejudice."58 The court noted the
absence of a cautionary instruction but also stated in dicta that "improper
remarks to the jury may in some instances be so prejudicial that neither
rebuke nor retraction will destroy their influence, and a new trial should
be granted despite the absence of an objection below or even in the
presence of a rebuke by the trial judge."
'59
2. Ex Parte Brandley
Perhaps the most extensive claim of race discrimination ever made
in a capital case was in Ex Parte Brandley.60 Brandley was a black male
charged with the rape homicide of a white female. After a hung jury
resulted in a mistrial, Brandley was retried, convicted of capital murder,
and appealed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his
conviction.
6 1
On state habeas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ordered an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to three of Brandley's seven claims. One
claim was that the factor of race had impermissibly entered his trial in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The hearing judge
entered findings of fact on all three of Brandley's claims, and the case
returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the court
reversed Brandley's conviction on the grounds that the investigative
procedures followed by the State had violated Brandley's due process
rights, 62 the majority's ruling contains no discussion of the race discrimi-
nation issue. An examination of the hearing judge's findings on the race
discrimination claim, however, is informative.63
The hearing judge began by noting that Brandley was a black male
convicted of raping and killing a sixteen year old white female. A
professor from the University of Texas testified, based on an elaborate
statistical study, that a black defendant who is convicted for a rape/
homicide of a white victim is five times more likely to receive the death
penalty than a white defendant with a black victim. The hearing judge
observed that the professor's methodology was "consistent" with the
Baldus study which the Supreme Court assumed to be valid in
McCleskey.
64
Both of Brandley's juries were all white, and in both trials the State
had used peremptory challenges to strike all qualified blacks.65 Trial
58 Id. See also State v. Houston, 534 A.2d 1293 (Me. 1987). In
Houston, the defendant was charged with assaulting a female victim.
The sentencing judge in a bench trial stated that he usually gave a jail
sentence "'when men are convicted of beating women or hitting
women"' because he held "'a very dim view of men hitting women."'
Id. at 1296 (emphasis in original). He then sentenced Houston to "two
to three days" of jail time so that Houston would know that he 'can't
go around hitting women."' Id. Noting that the statute was gender-
neutral, the Maine Supreme Court vacated Houston's sentence, find-
ing an impermissible gender-based classification in the trial judge's
statements. Id. at 1297.
59 Robinson, 520 So.2d at 7. See also Blair v. Armontrout, 916
F.2d 1310, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1990) (Heaney, J., concurring inpart and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 89 (1991). At Blair's trial,
the prosecutor speculated during closing arguments on "the victim's
fear at seeing 'this black man' with a gun." See id. There was no
objection, and the issue was not raised in state courts or in the Eighth
Circuit, which denied relief. See id. at 1351, n. 21. However, Judge
Heaney dissented, finding ineffective assistance of counsel and both
cause and prejudice for the default. Id. at 1351, n. 21, and 1335, n. 3.
Judge Heaney found that "[a]ny invitation to racial prejudice in the
criminal process is ... prohibited by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment."
manuals used by the prosecuting attorneys during both trials recom-
mended that black persons notbepermitted to serve on any criminaljury.
The hearing judge found that if any prosecutor deviated from this
practice, that attorney would be required to "explain why he departed
[from] standard practice by allowing a black person to serve on a criminal
jury."
66
In Brandley's first trial, only one juror held out and refused to
convict the defendant. During deliberations, the other jurors repeatedly
called him "Nigger lover." 67 After the trial, the holdout juror received
thousands of harassing phone calls where the caller would say, "Nigger
lover" and hang up.68 The hearing judge also found that the holdout juror
had difficulty obtaining employment years later as a result of his "not
guilty" vote.
The circumstances of Brandley's arrest and pre-trial detention also
reflected possible racial animus. Shortly after the victim's body was
discovered, a white police officer was asked who committed the murder.
Referring to Brandley, the officer stated, "the nigger was elected."
' 69
Bond was set at $30,000. When Brandley's attorneys attempted to make
the bond, the sheriff refused, stating, "[t]he little Nigger doesn't belong
on the ground." 70 The district attorney concurred with these sentiments
and went to the trial judge, without notice to Brandley's attorney. The
judge immediately signed an ex parte order increasing the bond to
$70,000.
Many members of the public, black and white, attended Brandley's
trial. However, whenever a black spectator exited the courtroom, a
sheriff's deputy would follow that person and keep him or her under
observation. An elderly white spectator in the audience repeatedly
stated, "[kill the nigger, kill the nigger... "71 In chambers, the district
attorney stated that if any announcements to the audience were neces-
sary, he would make the announcement to the white people, while
Brandley's attorneys could make the announcement to the black people.
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Brandley a
new trial based on a separate due process violation,72 these incredible
facts were not the basis for the court's reversal. However, Judge
Campbell addressed the race discrimination issue in dissent. His opinion
is instructive on the types of arguments which defense counsel should
anticipate in response to such a claim.
The dissent conceded that Brandley's claim went "much farther
than that of the defendant in McCleskey" because he introduced "evi-
dence suggesting the presence of racial discrimination in his particular
case."73 But Judge Campbell then examined each finding individually
Id. at 1351.
60 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
61 Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
62 Ex Parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 894-95.
63 A dissenting judge argued that all of Brandley's claims, includ-
ing the claim of racial bias, were without merit. Judge Campbell's
dissenting opinion examined the findings of fact at length. Contrary to
the hearing judge's conclusion, Judge Campbell determined that the
findings of fact were insufficient to satisfy McCleskey. Brandley, 781
S.W.2d at 913-33 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
64 See Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 926 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
65 Brandley's conviction became final before the United States
Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The
Court has since held thatBatson should not be given retroactive effect to
cases on collateral review. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).




70 See id. at 927.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 894 (majority opinion).
73 Id. at 928, n. 14 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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and found that a new trial was not warranted.
First, Judge Campbell found that the statistical study was insuffi-
cient, but accepted the study as "circumstantial evidence" of racial bias,
relying on McCleskey.74 Then the dissent dismissed suggestions of
racial bias in the selection of the first jury because its deliberations had
not produced the challenged conviction and sentence. Although he agreed
with Brandley that the prosecutor's trial manual, the testimony of district
attorneys, and the pattern of racially motivated peremptory challenges
supported "an inference of discriminatory intent" as to the second trial,75
Judge Campbell found that the evidence did not meet the "greater burden
of proof set out in Swain v. Alabama,"76 requiring a showing of "purpose-
ful discrimination" in the use of peremptory challenges. 77
The dissenting judge then dismissed allegations of racial slurs
directed at the holdout juror from the first trial, stating that such
statements provided only a speculative inference as to popular opinion at
the time of Brandley's second trial. 78 Although Judge Campbell found
the statement, "the nigger was elected" to be indicative of "the grossest
of racial insensitivity, ' 79 he concluded that the context of the statement
revealed that Brandley was "elected" notbecause of his race, butbecause
of his physical size. 80 Judge Campbell also dismissed Brandley's claim
pertaining to the racial motivation for the denial of his attempt to post
bond as moot, since Brandley had thereafter been convicted.81 Finally,
the dissent refused to give any weight to the evidence of the racially
charged nature of the trial, stating that the evidence failed to "establish
that the jury was aware" of the racist comments by the white spectator or
74 Id. at 929.
75 Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
76 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
77 Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 930 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
Brandley was precluded from relying onBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), because the Supreme Court decidedBatson after Brandley's
conviction became final. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
As Judge Campbell indicated, the case law available to Brandley
required a "greater burden" than Batson.
78 Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 930 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 932.
80 Id. The witness who testified to this statement said that he
heard the officer state, "the nigger was tall enough and strong enough
and he was elected." See id.
81 Id. The weaknesses in this argument are particularly striking.
If the investigators were initially motivated by racial animus, but not
justice, then the subsequent conviction is called into question. Re-
markably, the dissent uses that very conviction to vitiate the evidence
of its impropriety.
82 Id. at 933.
83 Id.
84 720 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
85 For instance, two jurors admitted using the word "nigger" on
occasion, and two jurors expressed a general fear of blacks. See id. at
1576.
86 Dobbs' trial attorney stated that blacks are less educated and
less intelligent than whites. He referred to the black community of
Chattanooga, Tennessee as "black boy jungle" and admitted to using
the word "nigger" jokingly. See id.
87 See id. at 1578. See also Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). In Coleman, a habeas petitioner
made a claim of racial discrimination based on the trial judge's
reference to him as "black boy" and on the fact that the prosecutor
allowed petitioner's white co-defendant to plead guilty and avoid the
death penalty while refusing to make similar allowances for petitioner.
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's refusal to grant
Coleman an evidentiary hearing on these allegations. Id. at 450-51.
However, Judge Reinhardt dissented, finding that Coleman presented
"more than enough of a showing of unequal and arbitrary treatment to
of the sheriff's practice of following black spectators who exited the
courtroom. 82 Judge Campbell concluded his dissent by stating that
"[t]he record in this case simply does not establish 'exceptionally clear
proof' of applicant's claim as required by McCleskey. Applicant should
be denied relief under this claim."
'83
3. Dobbs v. Zant
In Dobbs v. Zant,84 the petitioner in a federal habeas corpus action
claimed thathe had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and
the race of his victim. Dobbs introduced depositions of the jurors who
had decided his sentence. These depositions indicated varying degrees
of racial insensitivity and general bias.85 The petitioner also introduced
evidence of the trial judge's prior career as a segregationist legislator and
statements by his own trial attorney indicating general racial prejudice.
86
Finally, Dobbs introduced evidence that the judge and defense attorney
referred to the defendant at trial as "colored" and "colored boy."
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The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied
Dobbs' habeas petition,88 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.89 However, the district court's discussion of the admissibility
of juror testimony illustrates the intricacies of Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b).90 This rule, which holds most juror testimony inadmissible,
provides a potential opportunity to introduce such evidence in federal
court 91 when racial bias has played a part in the decision making process
during the state trial.
92
be entitled to a hearing before the United States District Court."Id. at 468
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit, en banc, subsequently
withdrew the panel's opinion and reversed Coleman's death sentence
based on a separate due process violation. Coleman v. McCormick, 874
F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
88 Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1581.
89 Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1412 (1 1th Cir. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993). The United States Supreme Court
determined that Dobbs was entitled to have a trial transcript admitted as
part of the record on habeas in order to support his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See case summary of Dobbs, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue.
90 Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) provides:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, ajuror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything
upon that or any otherjuror's mind or emotions as influencing
the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or ii nent
or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influ-
ence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may
a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror
concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying be received for these purposes.
See also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
91 Such evidence is also arguably admissible in Virginia courts. See
infra note 106.
92 Indeed, the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 606(b)
acknowledged the "substantial authority" which "refuses to allow a
juror to disclose irregularities which occur in the jury room, but allows
his testimony as to irregularities occurring outside." However, the
committee noted that "the door of the jury room is not necessarily
a satisfactory dividing point." Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory
committee's note.
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The district court in Dobbs noted that ajuror's statements "abouthis
mental processes in reaching [a] decision may not be used as evidence in
a subsequent challenge to the decision."' 93 However, the court quoted the
United States Supreme Court for the proposition that"a juror can testify
concerning 'any mental bias in matters unrelated to the specific issues
that the juror was called upon to decide and whether extraneous prejudi-
cial information was improperly brought to thejuror's attention.'" 94 The
Dobbs court found that "[r]acial prejudice is a 'mental bias ...
unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called upon to de-
cide.' 95 As a result, a habeas petitioner may inquire into mental biases
of the jurors who imposed the sentence at trial in order to show either an
Eighth Amendment or a Fourteenth Amendment
96 McCleskey claim.97
The Dobbs court then pointed out a glaring conflict: while Rule
606(b) excludes juror testimony concerning the sentencer's "mental
processes," McCleskey required that one who challenges a death sen-
tence bears the burden to show "actual bias in the sentencing decision." 98
The court considered this conflict in light of Tanner v. United States.99
In Tanner, a juror stated after trial that several jurors had used alcohol,
marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The Court found the evidence
inadmissible under Rule 606(b) because it determined that juror intoxi-
cation is not an outside influence on the deliberations. 100 However, the
Tanner Court took the additional step of determining whether that ruling
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury. In resolving this conflict, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were sufficiently protected
by voirdire, ajuror's obligation to report misconduct, and the defendant's
ability to show juror misconduct post-trial through the testimony of non-
jurors. 10 1 Important to the Court's reasoning was the fact that intoxica-
tion is an observable characteristic.
102
93 Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1572 (citation omitted).
94 Id. at 1573 (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121, n. 5
(1984)) (emphasis in original). It is significant that the Rushen Court
went beyond the express language of Rule 606(b) in permitting evidence
of a juror's "mental bias."
95 Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1573 (emphasis added).
96 The Dobbs court addressed only the Eighth Amendment aspect
of the Rushen language, but not the Fourteenth Amendment aspect. Id.
Certainly one who seeks to introduce evidence of "mental bias" alone
will have difficulty proving purposeful discrimination. However, where
the evidence of juror bias is so strong that it appears that a juror voted
against the defendant because of racial considerations, a Fourteenth
Amendment claim can be presented within the rubric of Rushen's
"mental bias" language. Furthermore, as the Dobbs court observed, an
Eighth Amendment McCleskey claim, purporting to show an impermis-
sible risk of racial discrimination, can clearly be made with evidence of
a juror's "mental bias." The Rushen language thus loosens the restric-
tions of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) for both Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment
claims.
97 Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1573. The court noted that its analysis,
to some extent, permitted a habeas petitioner to "bypass the voir dire
process and investigate the racial prejudices of the jurors after the verdict
has been received" and that the State had not raised an argument
challenging its ruling on that basis. Id. at 1573, n. 7. However, the court
also found that an attempt to demonstrate that the jury's decision was
based on race, which McCleskey required in order to establish an equal
protection violation, could not have been made during voir dire for the
obvious reason that the decision had not yet been rendered at that time. Id.
98 Id. at 1573.
99 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
100 Id. at 125. The Court relied on specific legislative history
stating that under Rule 606(b), ajuror could not "'testify to the drunken
condition of a fellow juror which so disabled him that he could not
participate in the jury's deliberations."'Id. at 123 (quoting H. R. Rep.
The Dobbs court noted the crucial distinction between Tanner's
claim ofjuror intoxication and a claim ofjuror discrimination on thebasis
of race: "[R]acial bias is not as observable as intoxication."1 03 The court
noted the availability of other methods of proving race discrimination
and concluded that "[riule 606(b)'s prohibition ordinarily would not
impair a defendant's ability to show an Equal Protection or Eighth
Amendment violation" through those methods. 104 Despite this observa-
tion, the court concluded:
In a given case, however, testimony of racial bias based on a
juror's conduct or statements during the deliberations may
become admissible notwithstanding Rule 606(b) if the admis-
sible evidence of ajuror's racial prejudice is so strong that the
death penalty appears to have been imposed on the basis of the
defendant's race. In the face of strong evidence that the
defendant's constitutional rights, under the standards articu-
lated in McCleskey, may have been violated, the statutory Rule
606(b) privilege would have to yield. In such a case, the
balance between the defendant's rights and the society's
interest in protecting the jury system would not be met by
enforcing Rule 606(b).
105
Despite the fact that the Dobbs court ruled against the petitioner on
the merits of his race discrimination claim, it is important to note that the
court admitted the crucial juror testimony into evidence. Attorneys
should consider interviewing or deposing jurors in any collateral chal-
lenge to a death sentence where racial bias is a potential issue.106 In
framing arguments on admissibility of juror testimony, several difficult
issues must be confronted. First, attorneys should cite the Rushen
No. 93-650, pp. 9-10 (1973) (emphasis supplied by the Court)).
101 Id. at 127.
102 See id. at 125-26.
103 Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. at 1574.
104 Id. The Court pointed out that evidence of racial bias can be
admitted in "several ways: during voir dire, by juror testimony about
another juror's statements or conduct prior to the verdict, and by post-
verdict evidence of a juror's bias." Id. (emphasis in original).
105 Id.
106 This avenue for relief need not be reserved exclusively for
federal habeas corpus. Although Rule 606(b) applies only in federal
court, post-verdict statements by jurors are also arguably admissible in
the race discrimination context under Virginia law. In Virginia courts,
the extent of permissible post-verdict inquiries into ajury's deliberations
and biases is determined by common law: "We have adhered strictly to
the general rule that the testimony of jurors should not be received to
impeach their verdict, especially on the ground of their own miscon-
duct." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 233 Va. 77,82,353 S.E.2d 747,
750 (1987). However, "there may be exceptional cases where juror
testimony might be admissible to impeach their verdict to prevent a
miscarriage of justice." Id. See also Friend, The Law of Evidence in
Virginia § 59(c) (3d ed. 1988) ("This rule is not a complete prohibition
of [juror testimony to impeach the jury's verdict], but it is clear that the
policy of the courts is to receive such testimony only in exceptional
circumstances.")
For an example of an application of the "miscarriage of justice," or
"exceptional circumstance" exception, see Harris v. Commonwealth, 13
Va. App. 47, 53,408 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1991) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to inquire into the extent to which
extraneous information about the defendant's future eligibility for parole
entered into the decision making process). Attorneys should argue, both
on direct appeal and on state habeas, that a miscarriage of justice would
result from the refusal to admit juror testimony which would show an
impermissible risk of purposeful discrimination based on race.
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2 -Page 31
language as support for admissibility of juror testimony demonstrating
a "mental bias" on the part of one or more jurors. This language is
available in support of both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 107
Second, if the evidence is excluded under Rule 606(b), attorneys should
address the dichotomy between Rule 606(b)'s exclusions andMcCleskey's
requirements for proving a race discrimination claim. In this situation,
attorneys should distinguish Tanner and refer to the analysis of the
district court in Dobbs. Attorneys should argue that ajuror can testify to
statements and deliberations at trial, notwithstanding Rule 606(b), if the
"evidence of a juror's racial prejudice is so strong that the death penalty
appears to have been imposed on the basis of the defendant's race." 108
D. Argue for a More Stringent Standard
Under the Virginia Constitution
Several state courts have considered imposing higher obligations
under their own constitutions than the United States Supreme Court has
required when contemplating statistical claims of racial discrimination
in capital cases. 10 9 Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution
provides that "the right to be free from any governmental discrimination
upon the basis of... race.., shall not be abridged."' 1 0 Although this
clause has been held to be no broader than the Equal Protection Clause
107 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
108 Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1574.
109 See, e.g., State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.) (Blackmar,
J., dissenting) (advocating that the Missouri Supreme Court should "be
mindful of appearances" and reduce a death sentence to life imprison-
ment without probation or parole pursuant to a state statute, notwith-
standingMcCleskey),cert. denied, 484U.S. 933 (1987);Statev.Koedatich,
548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988) (Handler, J., dissenting) (stating that, despite
McCleskey, "[t]he course of federal jurisprudence should not distract
state courts from an independent evaluation of the issue," and concluding
that the New Jersey constitution forbids administration of the death
penalty in a racially discriminatory manner), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017
(1989); State v. Green, 406 S.E.2d 852 (N.C. 1991) (rejecting a state and
federal constitutional claim of racial discrimination premised on statis-
tical evidence, but leaving the door open on the state claim, rejecting it
on the basis that "the statistical studies offered by the defendant do not
relate specifically to North Carolina or to the district in which the
defendant was tried"); People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk,
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,1t 1
Virginia attorneys should make race discrimination challenges under
both the Virginia and federal constitutions, if for no other reason than to
draw attention to the problems of race discrimination which continue to
plague the death penalty in Virginia. 112 Moreover, such a comprehen-
sive challenge acts as a safeguard against potential arguments of proce-
dural default, arguments which courts have so frequently embraced as a
means of precluding post-conviction review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the United States Supreme Court has severely limited the
opportunities to challenge a death sentence based on racial discrimina-
tion, the opportunities have not been completely eviscerated. This article
has provided several avenues through which such a claim might be
presented to a court. Attorneys should be prepared to assign racially
discriminatory patterns more specifically to individuals who can be held
accountable for the entire pattern. Attorneys must also be alert to any
case-specific evidence which might show that racial bias has played a
part in their clients' trials. Finally, statistical evidence of state-wide
disparities in the administration of Virginia's death penalty should be
assigned as error under the Virginia Constitution.
J., dissenting) (arguing that, where a defendant has shown that similarly
situated individuals have received lesser sentences, the defendant's
death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate, under either the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution).
110 Va. Const. Art. I, § 11.
111 See, e.g.,Archerv. Mayes,213 Va. 633,194 S.E.2d 707 (1973).
112 See Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543,555, 364 S.E.2d
483,490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). In Turner, the defendant
proffered a statistical study relating to the discriminatory impact of the
death penalty in Virginia. After Turner originally made his claim, the
United States Supreme Court decided McCleskey. Turner admitted that
McCleskey prevented a defendant from relying on statistics alone to
prove a statute invalid, but nevertheless asked the Supreme Court of
Virginia "'to hold to the contrary."' Turner, 234 Va. at 555,364 S.E.2d
at 483. The court stated simply: "We decline this request." Id. It is
unclear whether Turner's request was premised on the United States
Constitution or Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution.
ANYTHING SOMEONE ELSE SAYS CAN AND WILL BE USED
AGAINST YOU IN A COURT OF LAW: THE USE OF
UNADJUDICATED ACTS IN CAPITAL SENTENCING':'
BY: LAURA J. FENN
Picture yourself,'you are tired, exhausted, after so many days sitting with the same eleven people in that jury box. It is a strange
place to be. You didn't expect the courtroom would look so much like a church. All week long you have been listening, your mind
alternately concentrating and wandering. You have heard testimony, testimony from experts,from witnesses,from family members,
even from the defendant himself. You have seen evidence, compelling and personal physical evidence from the crime scene, about
the victim, who is dead now. You have heard enough testimony and seen enough evidence to convince you and the eleven others that
this man was guilty of committing a horrible, brutal crime. This man is a murderer.
You have unanimously decided to convict the defendant of capital murder and now you must decide whether he should be
sentenced to life imprisonment or be sentenced to die.
You hear more evidence. You hear psychiatrists discussing the mental state of the defendant. You hear a sibling telling you
about the background of the defendant. The stories of child abuse and the testimony about the defendant's mental disturbance begin
to give you a glimpse into his background, a hint of how someone might have such a troubled upbringing that his behavior would
culminate in such a horrible act... not that it would excuse what was done, but that it becomes slightly more understandable;
understandable enough that you begin to change your mind, to think that perhaps death is not the best punishment.
But then you hear a jail cell mate relating stories about other things the defendant has done. He tells you that the defendant
boasted about another murder he committed. Maybe he tells you that the defendant bragged about "taking" a girl andforcing her
